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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The last ten years have seen an upsurge in interest i n the nexus of trade and 
environmental policies. In part this reflects the need to deal with major global 
pollution problems, and in part a concern that globalisation may have adverse 
impacts on the environment. Environmentalists worry that globalisation m ay 
trigger a race-to-the bottom in environmental standards. While they would like to 
see upward harmonisation in environmental standards, they are sceptical about the 
ability of supra-national agencies to achieve this. Industrialists also raise concerns 
about the need for a ‘level playing field’ in environmental regulations because of 
fears about the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness. On the 
other hand, developing countries question whether disputes over differences in 
environmental regulations simply reflect a covert form of ‘green protectionism’. In 
this paper we review what light recent developments in economic analysis 
(conceptual and empirical) can shed on these concerns. We begin with 
conventional trade models in which government b odies have perfect information 
and are welfare maximisers, and show that this analysis does not provide much 
support for the concerns or proposed policy recommendations. We then turn to 
models of political economy and imperfect information to see whether they provide 
a better explanation for the concerns and policy recommendations. 
 
 
Keywords:   trade and environment, environmental dumping, green protectionism, 
harmonisation, asymmetric information, political economy, lobbying, environmental 
policy coordination. 
 
JEL Classification:  F18, F02, F42 
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1  Introduction 
 
The links between environmental policy and international trade have been a very 
prominent item in public policy debates over the last decade. This prominence was 
fuelled by a number of concerns. The first was probably the increasing awareness of 
transboundary or even global environmental problems such as acid rain, ozone depletion 
and climate change. To deal with such problems required international environmental 
agreements (IEAs) and it was recognised that standard free-rider problems might make it 
difficult to get effective agreements. However, in the presence of increasing international 
trade these difficulties might be exacerbated by the ‘leakage’ problem: action to regulate 
pollutants by any group of countries (or individual country) might encourage production 
and associated pollution to switch to unregulated countries. This led to the call to back 
IEAs with trade measures, which raises the question of how such measures would be 
viewed by GATT/WTO.  
 
A second concern was that even with purely local pollution problems, liberalisation of 
trade and capital flows might pose a threat to the environment. The increasingly 
vociferous campaign against globalisation has argued that trade liberalisation would first 
expand production, consumption and transport of goods, exacerbating damage to the 
environment and second make governments more concerned about the loss of 
competitiveness if they set tougher environmental policies than other countries. 
Governments might then set weaker environmental standards than warranted by 
environmental damage costs (‘environmental dumping’), causing a ‘regulatory chill’ or 
even a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in environmental standards as governments competed to 
attract internationally mobile capital (Esty (1994)). It was argued that countries that 
wanted to set tough environmental standards should be able to protect themselves against 
weaker standards elsewhere by imposing countervailing trade measures, but, at least if 
these involved production and process methods (PPM), such measures would be 
outlawed by GATT (as confirmed by the famous tuna-dolphin case). Fears about 
‘environmental dumping’ led to a call for some supra-national agency to coordinate and 
even harmonise environmental  standards across countries, although many   3 
environmentalists were sceptical about a body such as WTO playing this role, fearing it 
had been captured by transnational companies, and would always privilege free trade 
over the environment. The call for harmonisation of environmental standards was 
supported by industrialists arguing for a ‘level playing field’, but strongly opposed by 
developing countries who saw this as a form of ‘green protectionism’, denying them an 
ability to exploit one source of comparative advantage  – a relatively undamaged 
environment.  
 
Finally there have been a large and growing number of trade disputes over national 
product standards. The typical pattern is, that a country implements a new product 
regulation, which it argues to be necessary for either consumer or environmental 
protection, while importers to that market challenge the regulation as a “disguised barrier 
to trade” or simply “green protectionism”. The EU and the United States have, for 
example battled intensively over imports of genetically modified food into the EU and 
have spent a decade in court over hormones found in US beef exports to Europe. Supra-
National Institutions, such as the WTO and the European Court of Justice, were forced to 
rule on such trade disputes and have frequently struck down the contested national 
regulations as unnecessarily trade restrictive. This has left environmentalists with the 
conviction that in our increasingly globalised world national environmental standards are 
at the mercy of politically unaccountable supra-national institutions, which they suspect 
to be willing to promote international trade at the expense of sound environmental 
protection. 
 
Alongside this public debate there has been a substantial growth in the economics 
literature on trade and the environment. In part this reflected the natural wish for 
researchers to address issues of current concern, but also the development of new tools 
with which to address the issues1. There are already a number of surveys of this literature 
including some written by ourselves (Dean (1992), Wilson (1996), Ulph (1997a,b), 
Rauscher (2001), Schulze and Ursprung (2001), Sturm (2002)). However in this survey 
we shall give more emphasis to recent work, including some of our own, which stresses 
                                                  
1 There is now a new JEL- code for this field – F18.   4 
the importance of political economy aspects and informational problems, and the 
difficulties these might pose for resolving environmentally driven trade disputes. In the 
next section we give an overview of the conventional literature, which assumes welfare-
maximising g overnments and perfect information. In section 3 we introduce 
informational problems, in section 4 political economy issues, and in section 5 we argue 
that it is the interaction between informational problems and political economy that poses 
the real challenge. 
 
2  Environmental and Trade Policies with Welfare Maximising  
    Governments and Perfect Information 
 
In this section we begin by looking at what economic analysis has to say by asking what 
would be the optimal trade and environmental policies in the absence of any constraints. 
We then turn to second-best environmental and trade policies if there are constraints on 
policies. In considering optimal policies we shall need to distinguish between what might 
be optimal from the perspective of an individual country acting in its own self-interest 
from what might be globally optimal. We shall do this successively for models of a small 
open economy, a large open economy, imperfect competition, and mobile factors or 
plants. For ease of exposition we concentrate on pollution linked to production (PPM); in 
the main one can address pollution linked to consumption by reversing the roles of 
exports and imports.  Finally we survey the empirical literature.  
 
However before doing so we state a central theme. In the 1970s and 1980s, with a few 
exceptions we shall mention, there was little interaction between environmental 
economics and international economics. This did not reflect academic blinkers. It 
stemmed from a central tenet in economics: the importance of policy  targeting. This 
states that if policy-makers need to address a number of issues, then an efficient response 
requires they use at least as many policy instruments as the number of problems they are 
trying to tackle, that they should target specific instruments to deal with specific 
problems, and the most efficient instrument is likely to be one that focuses directly on the 
problem it addresses. In the context of trade and environment this means trade policies   5 
should address trade issues and environmental policies should address environmental 
issues
2. If environmental policies are set to deal appropriately with environmental 
problems, then one can discuss the setting of trade policies without considering their 
effect on the environment; similarly if trade policies are set appropriately to meet trade 
objectives, then one can discuss the design of environmental policies without considering 
their impact on trade. As we shall see the major linkages between these policy areas arise 
when constraints are imposed on policies in one or other arenas, and one needs to ask 
seriously how real these constraints are.  
 
As a related point it is worth setting out the economists’ benchmark of the ideal, or first-
best, global allocation of resources. This can be supported by competitive markets, free 
trade, and, what are called, Pigouvian environmental regulations, which ensure that, at 
the margin, environmental damage costs just equal the cost of abating pollution, and 
these marginal abatement costs are the same for all polluters. For a global pollutant, like 
CO2 emissions, the relevant marginal damage costs are the total additional costs 
aggregated across all countries in the world. This first-best allocation illustrates the 
targeting principle: free trade is what trade economists argue for in the absence of any 
consideration about the environment and Pigouvian environmental policies are what 
environmental economists argue for in the absence of any consideration about trade. We 
shall be interested in whether a government sets too lax environmental policies (marginal 
abatement costs below marginal damage costs), which is sometimes called 
‘environmental dumping’, or too tough environmental policies (marginal abatement cost 
above marginal damage cost) which is sometimes called ‘environmental protectionism’. 
 
2.1 Small Open Economy. 
 
The natural starting point for examining trade and environment linkages is the small open 
economy model of perfectly competitive markets, countries which are too small to 
influence world prices and welfare m aximising governments (Baumol (1971), Pethig 
                                                  
2 A good illustration of this principle can be found in the discussion in Anderson (2000) of how 
‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture should be handled in relation to WTO rules.   6 
(1976), McGuire (1982), Merrifield (1988), Krutilla (1991), Copeland (1994), Neary 
(2000) amongst others).   
 
With no transboundary pollution, optimal policies for each country would be to have free 
trade and Pigouvian environmental policies, for the obvious reason that the only market 
failure in such a world is the environmental externality and government policy should 
correct this efficiently. Note that this is true for each country irrespective of whether 
other countries pursue such policies. Comparative advantage applies: amongst countries 
with the same relative endowment of other factors, those which are well-endowed with 
environmental resources (in a general sense – see Rauscher (2001)) will export goods 
which are on average ‘dirty’ goods, while those which have relatively scarce 
environments will export ‘clean’ goods. But technologies may be such that ‘dirty’ goods 
are also capital intensive in production, and so which countries actually produce ‘dirty’ 
goods will depend in a more general way on factor endowments
3. In general there is no 
reason to believe that countries will set the same environmental standards.  
 
Turning to second-best policies, if, for some reason, a country had an irremovable tariff 
in place, this would affect environmental policy. If the tariff encouraged too much 
production of the dirty good, then environmental policy should be made tougher than 
Pigouvian to offset this trade distortion. Similarly if there was inadequate environmental 
policy it might be desirable to adjust trade polices; if there was inadequate internalisation 
of environmental damages on a good that was exported it might be better to have a tariff 
on exports. But trade policies will rarely be even second-best policies for dealing with 
environmental damage. If pollution emissions are linked to production then if it not 
possible to tax emissions directly it will be better to tax production, rather than taxing 
exports. Trade policies may even be counter-productive: preventing  exports of timber 
products may so reduce the value of forests that it encourages land clearance for 
agriculture (WTO (1999)).  
 
                                                  
3 There may also be production externalities from environmental damages which affect productivities, and 
these could dominate factor endowment effects (Copeland and Taylor (1999)).    7 
Another way of stating these results is to consider trade liberalisation. Provided 
environmental policies properly internalise environmental damages, trade liberalisation 
benefits all countries. If there are inadequate environmental policies, trade liberalisation 
may not be beneficial to some countries, but, as argued, trade instruments are unlikely to 
be second-best ways of dealing with environmental policy failures. What about the 
impact on the environment? Following Grossman and Krueger (1993), Antweiler, 
Copeland and Taylor (1998) this can be decomposed into 3 effects. The composition 
effect says that countries will change the m ix of goods they produce to reflect 
comparative advantage; if environmental policy is set by an emission tax and this remains 
unchanged, the composition effect will worsen the environment in countries with a 
comparative advantage in producing dirty goods a nd improve it in countries with a 
comparative advantage in producing clean goods. Second, there will be an adjustment in 
environmental policy which will affect will affect how goods are produced  – the 
technique effect. In the country exporting dirty goods, environmental policy will need to 
be tightened, and relaxed in countries importing such goods. Finally there is a  scale 
effect. Trade liberalisation will raise income in all countries, which will induce expansion 
of demand for all normal goods, including the environment. So this could both increase 
demand for dirty goods while leading to a further tightening of environmental policy. The 
net impact of all three effects is ambiguous, and so it is an empirical matter how trade 
liberalisation affects the environment. With a strong enough income effect on demand for 
a cleaner environment, it is possible that trade liberalisation will not only raise welfare in 
all countries, but also lead to a cleaner environment in all countries. 
 
Finally we consider what happens if there is transboundary pollution. Countries acting 
non-cooperatively in their own self-interest will again choose free trade and 
environmental policies which fully internalise their own domestic damage costs, but will 
ignore the effects of their pollution on other countries. For transboundary pollution it is 
global damage costs that matter, so this outcome will not be globally efficient. However, 
because countries are small they cannot affect world prices and hence cannot affect 
pollution generated in other countries, so there is nothing that can be done through trade   8 
policies to affect this outcome. The only solution is for countries to cooperate through an 
IEA.  
 
To summarise, in this kind of world many of the concerns outlined in the introduction do 
not arise. Trade liberalisation brings welfare benefits to all countries provided 
environmental damages are internalised through environmental policies. Whether this 
translates into a cleaner environment in all countries is an empirical matter but it is not 
precluded. There is no reason to believe governments will engage in either environmental 
dumping or environmental protectionism. Environmental policies are quite likely to differ 
across countries and this is not damaging to competitiveness, it is a reflection of the 
playing out of comparative advantage. There is no case for harmonising environmental 
policies or even coordinating them for purely domestic environmental issues. The only 
area where there is a need for supra-national intervention is to deal with transboundary 
pollution.  
 
2.2 Large Open Economy. 
 
We now suppose that some countries are large enough to be able to influence world 
prices in some markets (see Markusen (1975), Rauscher (1997), Neary (2000)). How 
does this change the previous analysis?  
 
In the absence of transboundary pollution, the optimal policies from the point of view of 
an individual country acting independently is to use trade policies to exploit market 
power and Pigouvian policies to deal with environmental problems (the policy targeting 
principle again). Trade policies will consist of an optimal tariff on exports (to drive up the 
price the country receives for its exports at the expense of foreign consumers), or an 
optimal tariff on imports to drive down the price it pays for imports (at the expense of 
foreign producers). As this implies, these attempts by a country to change the terms-of-
trade in its favour damage other countries, so this outcome is not globally efficient. 
Some, and maybe all, countries will be worse off than if they could commit to free trade. 
Global efficiency is again secured by free trade and Pigouvian environmental policies.    9 
 
Turning to second-best policies, if a country has a tariff which it cannot adjust and which 
differs from the optimal tariff, it will want to adjust its environmental policy to reflect 
this. So if, say because of trade liberalisation, it cannot impose tariffs, then where it is an 
exporter and has market power it will set environmental policies which are tougher than 
Pigouvian (to restrict domestic supply and hence drive up the world price it receives), 
while if it is an importer it will set policies weaker than Pigouvian (to expand domestic 
supply and hence drive down the world price it pays). There is no reason to believe there 
will be a systematic tendency for all countries to engage in either environmental dumping 
or environmental protectionism. On the other hand if a country, for some reason, is 
unable to set Pigouvian environmental policies, there may be a case for adjusting trade 
policies to reflect this, in the way analysed in the small economy case, but again it is 
unlikely that trade policies are even second-best policies to address environmental 
problems.  
 
However there is now a possible additional argument for adjusting trade policy (see 
Rauscher (2001)). Suppose a foreign country was not fully internalising its environmental 
damage costs
4 in its export sector (so it was engaging in environmental dumping). This 
will encourage excessive exports and drive down the terms-of-trade against the exporter
5. 
A countervailing import tariff equal to the (implicit) subsidy set by the exporter will re-
establish global efficiency, and give a further improvement in the terms of trade to the 
importer. This is just the analogue of standard anti-dumping arguments. But notice it is a 
pure terms-of-trade argument. It has nothing to do with protecting the domestic 
environment (which may actually worsen).  
 
                                                  
4 This is not the same thing as having a weaker environmental policy than another country; it is a policy 
weaker than the Pigouvian policy appropriate for that country. 
5 It is not clear why the foreign country would do this, since, as just noted, its optimal policy is to set too 
tough an environmental policy for term -of -trade reasons.  A similar argument could be made if the foreign 
country was, more plausibly, engaging in environmental dumping in its import competing sector. This 
would move the terms -of-trade in favour of the foreign country. The home exporting country  would then 
have to subsidise its exports to correct for this, but this would further move the terms-of-trade in favour of 
the foreign country.   10 
Turning to trade liberalisation, the arguments are as before. If countries use Pigouvian 
environmental policies to control pollution then trade liberalisation improves welfare in 
all countries. Note there is now a need for some supra-national agency to help achieve 
trade liberalisation since it is not in the self-interest of individual countries to impose free 
trade (see Maggi (1999), Bagwell and Staiger (1999) for analyses of why something like 
the WTO is necessary). Since we know that, if trade instruments are banned, countries 
with market power will want to set environmental policies that differ from Pigouvian, 
trade liberalisation may not make all countries better off than autarky. However we can 
use a variant of an argument by Walz and Wellisch (1997) (to be discussed in the next 
section) to suggest that countries may be better off with free trade and optimally chosen 
non-Pigouvian environmental policies than with optimally chosen trade policies and 
Pigouvian environmental policies. The argument is that in both cases, attempts by 
countries to shift terms-of-trade in their favour, whether directly b y trade policies or 
indirectly by environmental policies, impose externalities on others, and if these are 
mutual externalities, then, as said earlier it is possible that all countries are worse off than 
in the first-best of free trade and Pigouvian taxes. But distorting environmental policies 
imposes a direct welfare cost on countries, whereas using trade instruments does not (this 
ignores costs of raising public funds), so there will be less distortion if countries use 
environmental policies than if they  use trade policies. So while neither outcome is 
globally efficient, it may be possible to rank them, and favour the outcome with trade 
liberalisation.  
 
In terms of the effect of trade liberalisation on the environment, the analysis in terms of 
composition, technique and scale effects is still applicable, although the actual effects 
will be rather different for the reasons set out above. In particular the technique effect 
may need to reflect the fact that environmental policies will not be adjusted in a 
Pigouvian manner.  
 
Finally, we consider what happens if there is transboundary pollution. As in the small 
country case, a country acting non-cooperatively in its own self-interest will ignore the 
effect of its emissions on other countries. But it needs to consider the impact of their   11 
pollution on its own environment. In the small country case there was nothing it could do 
about it. In the large country case it can, by acting to lower world prices and so 
discourage foreign production and pollution (Markusen (1975), Baumol and Oates 
(1988), Rauscher (1997)). Using trade policies it can do this by subsidising exports or 
taxing imports. If trade policies are not allowed, it can do this by weakening domestic 
environmental policies. In both cases it is accepting a bit more domestic pollution for a 
reduction in foreign pollution. Of course these interventions by individual countries are 
not globally efficient. The globally efficient policy is again free trade, and Pigouvian 
environmental policies, with IEAs to ensure that for transboundary pollution problems 
countries set policies to balance domestic abatement costs against global damage costs. 
This is just the policy targeting principle.  
 
To summarise, some form of supra-national intervention may be necessary to secure free 
trade, to ensure that countries do not distort domestic environmental policies as a proxy 
for trade policies and to deal with transboundary pollution problems. But there is no 
suggestion that there will be a race-to-the bottom (or the top) in environmental policies; 
nor will it be generally desirable to harmonise environmental policies
6.  
 
2.3 Imperfect Competition and Strategic Policy Making. 
 
In the previous sub-sections it was assumed that there were sufficient firms in each 
market for markets to be treated as perfectly competitive. We now consider how 
arguments might differ if, because of scale economies relative to market size, there are 
relatively few firms competing internationally. The prototypical model that has been used 
is a variant of the famous Brander-Spencer (1985) model where a small number of firms, 
each located in a different country, produce a homogeneous good which is exported to 
another set of countries. The firms compete by setting quantities, taking as given the 
outputs produced by their rivals. Brander and Spencer showed that governments would 
have incentives to set export subsidies, to lower the costs of their domestic producer and   12 
try to increase the market share of their domestic firm and hence get a bigger share of the 
industry profits (‘rent-shifting’). Of course if all countries do this, it just expands industry 
output and drives down industry profits. 
 
The variation is to have production generate pollution which might be abated, at a cost 
(see Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Ulph (1996a)). Optimal policies 
from the perspective of each government would be to set a Brander-Spencer export 
subsidy and a Pigouvian environmental policy. But the interesting second-best policy 
arises when trade policies are not available. Now it will pay all governments to set 
weaker environmental policies than Pigouvian, because this will act like the missing 
export subsidy to lower domestic production costs. So now we have a model which could 
explain ‘environmental dumping’ by all governments. But it is not a ‘race-to-the bottom’ 
in the sense that environmental policies are abandoned. Indeed, as Barrett (1994) notes, 
assuming that export subsidies are costless to raise, the extent of implicit subsidisation 
using environmental policies will be less than with trade policies, because relaxing 
environmental policies has a real welfare cost. This is what underlies the argument by 
Walz and Wellisch (1997) referred to in the last section. When all governments try to get 
greater market shares for their producers, they end up with self-defeating policies in 
which industry output is expanded, industry profits reduced, and, if they use 
environmental policies, increased environmental damage. But because the extent of 
subsidisation is less when governments are restricted to environmental policies than when 
they can also use trade policies, all the producing countries can be better off when trade 
policies are restricted.  
 
If there is transboundary pollution, then, as in the large country case, countries have an 
interest in reducing foreign production and hence pollution, and this just increases the 
size of the export subsidy (whether direct or indirect through a weakened environmental 
policy (Kennedy (1994)).  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
6 The only situation where there may be a case for harmonised policies is where there is a uniformly mixed 
global pollutant such as CO2 emissions, where efficiency would require all countries an emission tax equal   13 
While it looks as if this provides a basis for environmentalists’ concerns about 
environmental dumping, the problem is that the conclusions are by no means robust to 
changes in assumption, of which we mention just three. If firms compete in price, rather 
than quantity, then the incentive is for governments to impose an export tax, or, if that is 
outlawed, to set environmental policies tougher than Pigouvian (Barrett (1994), Ulph 
(1996b)).  The reason is that firms are undercutting each other in price. And whereas, 
when firms compete in outputs, if one firm did expand output others would reduce their 
output, when they compete in price if one firm raised its price, other firms would do 
likewise. The strategic incentive for a government is to get firms in other countries to 
raise their prices, and they do this by inducing the domestic firm to raise its price by 
driving up its costs, either through an export tax or environmental policies than 
Pigouvian
7. This also means that the collective actions by governments will raise market 
price and hence industry profits. But for the same reason given by Barrett (1994), the 
extent to which prices rise will be less when governments use environmental policies 
than when they use trade policies. So, as Sturm (2000) shows, this can reverse the Walz 
and Wellisch (1997) conclusion that producing countries will be better off when they are 
restricted to using only environmental policies as opposed to also using trade policies. 
 
 A second modification to the prototypical model is to have several firms located in one 
country (Barrett (1994), Althammer and Bucholz (1995)). The government is now 
concerned both with competition between domestic producers and foreign rivals, for 
which an export subsidy or a weak environmental policy would be needed, and about 
competition between domestic producers, which leads to excessive domestic production, 
for which an export tax or a strong environmental policy would be needed (the analogue 
of the argument for a large exporting country discussed in the previous section). The mix 
of these arguments can go either way.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
to global marginal damage cost, which by definition is the same for all  
7 Note that in this case we do not get environmental dumping in the sense of having environmental policies 
weaker than Pigouvian. But it is still the case that because countries are acting non-cooperatively, they will 
not set environmental policies as tough as they would set if they acted co-operatively.    14 
Finally, the previous papers assumed that only governments can strategically manipulate 
markets to reduce foreign production. But producers themselves will have incentives to 
try to do that, by, for example, investing in more capital or R&D than would otherwise be 
warranted in order to reduce operating costs and hence obtain a strategic competitive 
advantage. Does this reduce or even reverse governments’ incentives to weaken 
environmental policy? This question is closely related to the ‘Porter hypothesis’ (Porter 
(1991)): that tough environmental regulations, far from harming competitiveness, may 
actually boost it by encouraging domestic firms to invest in ‘green technologies’ ahead of 
their rivals. However a careful analysis of these issues (Ulph (1996b,c), Ulph and Ulph 
(1996)) shows that the results are ambiguous. On the one hand, while strategic 
investment by firms is a substitute for government strategic policy, and hence reduces the 
direct need for strategic manipulation of trade or environmental policies by governments, 
the strategic investments made by firms can in turn be manipulated by governments. 
Moreover, it is not generally true that tougher environmental regulations always increase 
the incentives for firms to do more ‘green R&D’, and even if it does this may not justify 
governments setting environmental policies tougher than Pigouvian, because there are 
still rent-shifting arguments for relaxing it. In short, in the absence of other policy 
instruments, environmental p olicies may be tougher or weaker than Pigouvian when 
account is taken of firms’ own strategic behaviour.  
 
Finally we note again that first-best allocations of resources would be sustained by free 
trade, Pigouvian environmental policies, and competition policies which dealt with the 
consequences of imperfectly competitive markets. Suppose one just wanted to improve 
the outcome with environmental dumping by keeping free trade and trying to eliminate 
environmental dumping. WTO (1999) noted that in the US, when it was suspected that 
the states were not setting tough enough environmental policies because of strategic trade 
considerations, the federal government took more control of environmental policy. This 
reflects the fact that environmental dumping arises because national governments acting 
non-cooperatively set weaker environmental policies than if they cooperated, and one 
mechanism for cooperation is to move authority to a supra-national level. But WTO 
(1999) also noted that in the US case this meant the imposition of uniform environmental   15 
standards across all states. But, again, because of comparative advantage, it will in 
general be efficient for countries to set different environmental standards. Overcoming 
environmental dumping does not require harmonisation of environmental standards. 
 
 As noted by Ulph (1999), if a supra-national agency announced it was going to impose 
harmonised environmental standards, then there may be no policy which makes all states 
better off than if they did not cooperate, so states will not volunteer to give up their 
powers to such an agency. It is sometimes thought that a better approach is to set 
minimum environmental standards, so that some states can set tougher standards if they 
wish, and so one can ratchet up environmental standards in all states. But Kanbur, Keen 
and van Wijnbergern (1995), and Ulph (1999) also showed that minimum standards may 
suffer the same problem as harmonisation: at least one state might be made worse off and 
so would veto the use of this approach to dealing with environmental dumping.  By the 
definition of environmental dumping just given, there will exist a range of efficient 
policies which will make all countries better off than with environmental dumping, but 
these cannot be achieved by harmonisation or minimum standards and they will generally 
involve different standards for countries with different environmental endowments. It is 
one of these policies which a supra-national agency should select. 
 
In summary, while it is possible to construct arguments why governments might all 
engage in environmental dumping, the extent of such dumping is likely to be less than 
would occur with trade policies. More importantly, the arguments are not robust, and one 
can construct equally plausible arguments why governments may set too tough 
environmental policies to give their domestic producers a strategic competitive 
advantage.  Taking the more general definition of environmental dumping – states acting 
non-cooperatively set weaker policies than if they act cooperatively  – there may be a 
need for a supra-national agency to bring about this cooperative outcome, but this does 
not involve harmonisation of environmental standards.   16 
2.4 Mobile Factors or Plants.  
 
It might be argued that the previous analysis does not really capture the concerns of 
environmentalists or industrialists, which are mainly with the implications of reducing 
barriers to capital mobility. So the main concern by industrialists is that tougher 
environmental legislation in one country will just encourage capital or firms to move to 
other countries, and the concern of environmentalists is that governments’ reactions to 
such possibilities will make them reluctant to raise environmental standards or even to 
want to cut them. Space precludes a detailed discussion of this issue (see Wilson (1996), 
Ulph (1997a,b), Rauscher (2001), and Sturm (2002) for more detailed surveys).  
 
Oates and Schwab (1988) is the classic reference on policy competition with mobile 
capital. There are a large number of countries with immobile labour competing to attract 
mobile capital. Markets are competitive. Governments can impose capital taxes or 
emission standards. Higher emissions raise the return to capital but harm domestic 
residents. They show that optimal policies involve n o tax on capital and Pigouvian 
environmental policies. The argument, which is really the same as the simple open-
economy model in section 2.1, is that there is only one distortion here, and it should be 
optimally regulated. If capital taxes are constrained to be positive, then governments will 
optimally offset that by relaxing environmental policies. Other kinds of second-best 
scenarios can be constructed – for example assuming that governments need tax revenues 
for public goods and that labour taxes are distorting. Then second-best policy may 
involve environmental policies laxer than Pigouvian, because this will attract capital 
which reduces the distortion from labour taxes (Kim and Wilson (1997)) 
 
Hoel (1997) provides a useful illustration of what can happen if firms are mobile (see 
also Rauscher (1995)). He considers a simple model where there are two countries, a 
single, monopolist, firm which serves consumers in both countries, generates pollution, 
and can costlessly relocate to any country, and a single government policy instrument – 
an emission tax. If the firm’s location was fixed, then the government of that country 
would set an emission tax which reflected four elements of the ‘surplus’ it might make:   17 
consumer welfare, firm profits earned by domestic shareholders, emission tax revenues 
and environmental damages. This tax need not be Pigouvian because there are other 
distortions (there is monopoly power, which would justify setting too weak 
environmental policy to expand firm output, although some of these benefits go to the 
other country; some profits may go outside the country, which would justify too tough an 
environmental policy as a means of taxing foreign shareholders). The firm will locate 
wherever it faces the lower tax. Governments need to consider what surplus it makes with 
and without the firm (note that the first two elements of surplus are independent of firm 
location). There are three possible outcomes: in some cases the government in which the 
firm locates will be able to set its optimal environmental policy. In other cases there will 
be a race-to-the-bottom in which emission taxes are driven down to the point where each 
government is indifferent between having the firm or not. Finally there can be a race-to-
the-top where environmental damages are so high relative to emission tax revenues that 
countries are better off if the firm is located in the other country. This can lead to an 
inefficient ‘NIMBY’ outcome where each government sets such high environmental 
standards that the firm closes down, despite the fact that it would be in their collective 
interest for the firm to locate and operate in one of the countries. 
 
 Introducing several firms and transport costs complicates the model (Markusen, Morey 
and Olewiler (1993, 1995), Ulph and Valentini (1997, 2001a,b) but the basic conclusion 
remains the same as with imperfect competition with fixed locations: there is no robust 
argument that competition for mobile firms necessarily results in a race-to-the-bottom; 
one can just as plausibly get a race-to-the-top. Ulph and Valentini (2001a) also show that, 
with more than one firm, even if there is environmental dumping, it may be less when 
firms are footloose than when their locations are fixed (as in section 2.3).  So the 
presumption made at the start of this subsection, that it is the possibility of relocation of 
firms that generates the real threat of environmental dumping, is not correct.   18 
2.5 Empirical Evidence. 
 
The analysis of the previous sections shows that (i) there is no general conclusion 
whether liberalisation of trade in goods and capital is good for welfare or the 
environment, although provided Pigouvian environmental policies are in place and other 
distortions addressed by appropriate policies, then the usual arguments for trade 
liberalisation go through; (ii) there is no robust conclusion whether competition between 
states will lead to a race-to-the-bottom in environmental policies. So many of these issues 
have to be resolved empirically. 
 
Lack of space prevents a detailed survey – see Rauscher (2001) and WTO (1999) for 
good recent surveys. In terms of the impact of environmental regulation on trade and 
factor movements, this is approached in a number of stages. First there is the question of 
how tougher environmental regulations affect f actor productivities and profits. Most 
studies have found that tougher environmental regulations have reduced factor 
productivities and profitability, as conventional theory suggests, though there is some 
support for the Porter hypothesis from Biorn, Golombek, and Raknerud (1998) who 
found that Norwegian firms in pollution intensive industries which were subject to 
environmental regulation were less likely to exit the industry than non-regulated firms. 
Second, there is the question of how environmental regulations affect trade patterns. 
Tobey (1990) and Murrell and Ryterman (1991) conclude that environmental regulations 
have little effect on trade patterns. Finally there is the question of how environmental 
regulations affect the location of firms. Much of the empirical evidence comes from 
analysis of location decisions across US states. Earlier studies suggested little impact of 
environmental regulations on location decisions (Jaffee at al (1995), Levinson (1997)). 
More recent studies (List and Co (2000) and List and McHone (2000) which model more 
carefully how US legislation has been implemented (distinguishing between attainment 
and non-attainment areas) suggest that location decisions of producers in pollution-
intensive industries are significantly affected by environmental regulations, but this only 
occurs for significant differences in policies: small differences in regulations have no 
effect on location.   19 
 
Turning now to the effects of trade liberalisation on the environment, we argued that 
these could be broken down into composition, technique and scale effects, and Antweiler, 
Copeland and Taylor (1998) analysed these effects empirically. They found that the 
composition effect had mixed results as expected, with developed countries and the 
poorest developing countries expanding production of pollution intensive goods while 
middle income developing countries reduced their production of such goods. The scale 
effect had a negative component, with a 1% increase in income leading to a 0.3% 
increase in demand for pollution-intensive goods. But the technique effect, which they 
also link to increases in income, meant that a 1% increase in income also led to demands 
for a cleaner environment which reduced pollution by 1.4%. This latter effect they found 
to be strongest so that trade liberalisation improved the environment. Cole, Rayner and 
Bates (1998) analysed the impact of the Uruguay Round and found that it had led to 
global increases in a range of pollutants by between 0.1 and 0.5%, with the bigger 
increases in g lobal pollutants. However they argued that the benefits of trade 
liberalisation ($200-500bn annually) would be much greater than the additional 
abatement costs that would have been needed to offset these increases in emissions.  
 
Finally there is the question of whether countries have engaged in environmental 
dumping or environmental protection, this is inherently difficult to analyse because it 
requires calculating what the Pigouvian environmental standards would be. Levinson 
(1999) has studied taxes on hazardous waste movements in the US and suggests that the 
increases that have been experienced in such taxes 1988  – 93 can be explained by 
NIMBY behaviour. There is some case study evidence that suggests that trade 
liberalisation has led countries to moderate their environmental regulations for fear of 
competitiveness effects (Esty and Geradin (1998)), but one of the examples they quote is 
the failure of some industrialised countries (EU, US, Japan and Australia) to adopt energy 
taxes to deal with climate change, but this could be explained by conventional free rider 
arguments rather than strategic trade arguments. For reasons given, it is difficult to get 
systematic evidence on whether environmental dumping is in practice a serious issue.  
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To summarise: the empirical evidence does not suggest that there are significant effects 
of environmental policy on trade or that trade liberalisation has a serious impact on the 
environment. Of course the empirical evidence has limitations, particularly the difficulty 
of g etting reliable indicators of both environmental stringency and environmental 
damage, and it does appear from some of the US studies on location effects that as 
researchers have got better ways of measuring differences in environmental stringency so 
the effects on location decisions have become more significant. So it could be premature 
to conclude that trade and environment linkages are weak. 
 
There are a number of other arguments why these effects have turned out to be much 
smaller than the public debate suggests. The usual one is to note that pollution abatement 
costs are a relatively small proportion of production costs (1%-5% is the usual range – 
see WTO (1999)) so could not be expected to have a major impact on trade. Second, 
firms take a long-term view of environmental regulations and even if regulations are low 
now in one country they expect some longer-term convergence
8.  Even if firms thought 
that differences in environmental stringency were significant and sustainable, this might 
still not influence their decision on where to locate or the environmental standards to set, 
because there are costs to maintaining different kinds of plants or products designed to 
meet different standards. They may prefer to design plants and products to meet the 
highest foreseeable standards. Even if regulations differed significantly across countries, 
firms may be sensitive to the views of consumers or shareholders about attempts to 
exploit such differences. Finally, it is argued that one reason firms have not been more 
responsive to differences in environmental regulations is that they have negotiated 
offsetting packages of concessions in the form of subsidies or trade protection. We take 
up this argument in later sections. 
                                                  
8 This relates to some theoretical arguments (Ulph and Valentini (2001b)) that the literature on the impacts 
of environmental policy on location assumes that countries can make long-term commitments to 
environmental policies that cover the life of a plant, but do not explain the source of such commitment 
powers.    21 
2.5 Conclusions from Conventional Models.  
 
Our review of the conventional economic models and empirical evidence leads to the 
conclusion that there are neither strong conceptual nor empirical arguments to support the 
many of the concerns or policy recommendations that we outlined in the introduction. 
However this analysis has been based on the assumptions of welfare maximising 
governments and perfect information, for example about environmental damage costs in 
different countries. In the rest of this paper we see how far these conclusions need to be 
modified when we allow for asymmetric information and governments which are 
influenced by special interest groups. We address these issues first in isolation and then 
together. 
 
3. Information Problems 
 
To illustrate one of the information issues we are going to be concerned with, suppose we 
are dealing only with domestic pollution, we take as given that there is trade 
liberalisation, so we know that in both the large country case and the imperfect 
competition case welfare-maximising governments acting non-cooperatively will seek to 
distort their environmental policies away from Pigouvian to try to gain some advantage. 
So there is a case for some supra-national agency to try to coordinate environmental 
policies to overcome the inefficiencies caused by non-cooperation. We have emphasised 
in the last section that comparative advantage means that it will be efficient for countries 
with different environmental endowments, broadly defined, to set different environmental 
standards. So simply observing different environmental standards tells us nothing about 
whether countries are distorting their environmental policies. A supra-national agency 
would need to know damage costs in different countries both to decide whether there are 
any distortions and to compute appropriate efficient cooperative environmental standards.  
 
But standard subsidiarity arguments suggests that countries may have much better 
information about their local damage costs than a supra-national agency might have. If   22 
this is correct
9, does this informational asymmetry mean that it would be better to just 
leave environmental policy-making at the national level, or that if we do set policy at a 
supra-national level the supra-national agency should just set uniform standards, which 
has the advantage of simplicity and not having to justify why it sets different standards in 
different countries? Maybe this explains why, as noted earlier, that when the US 
increased federal responsibility for setting environmental standards they were uniform 
across states.  
 
A negative response to these questions was given in Ulph (2000) in a model of local 
pollution. The context was a federal system where imperfect competition meant that 
states acting non-cooperatively would engage in environmental dumping (in both senses). 
States know their own damage costs, but not others, and the federal government knows 
only the distribution of possible damage costs, which is the same for each state. There are 
three possible ways environmental standards could be set. They could be set at the state 
level, which has the advantage that this exploits the good information held by states, but 
causes environmental dumping. They could be set by the federal government based just 
on their best guess about damage costs in each state  – which in this case would be 
expected damage costs and would be the same for each state, so standards would be 
harmonised. Or they could be set by the federal government in such a way that states 
have incentives to truthfully reveal their information. In this setting, states with high 
damage costs have incentives to pretend they have low damage costs, to get weaker 
standards and hence higher output
10. To overcome these incentives to lie the federal 
government sets environmental standards which differ less between states with different 
damage costs than it would with full information, but this does not mean harmonisation. 
                                                  
9 Of course this might not be true. Economies of scale or scope in collecting information may mean that a 
supra-national agency might be better placed to collect good damage cost data than individual national 
agencies. But this would just reinforce the argument for having a supra-national agency set policy. For a 
discussion of informational problems and the optimal level of decentralisation of environmental policies for 
watershed management in developing countries see Coxhead (2002). 
10 Bigano (2002) extends the model of Ulph (2000) to include transboundary pollution. He shows that if 
this is sufficiently important this may reverse the incentives to misreport. A state with low damage costs 
would claim  to have high damage costs in order that the federal government would impose tough 
environmental policies on other states whose pollution affects this state. However it remains the case that 
more sophisticated policies to induce states to reveal their information will be preferred to simple 
harmonisation.    23 
It turns out that having the federal government set standards in this sophisticated way is 
always the best policy, so the benefits from overcoming environmental dumping 
outweighs the losses caused by asymmetric information. Moreover, if the federal 
government uses harmonisation, then if damage costs have more than a moderate 
variance, harmonisation is worse than setting the policy level.  So information problems 
cannot justify harmonisation as a means of overcoming environmental dumping. We shall 
return to this problem in section 5. 
 
4  Political Economy 
 
So far we have assumed that governments seek to maximise overall welfare of all its 
citizens. In this section we consider the implications of assuming that governments are 
prey to capture by special interest groups. Why might we be interested in this approach? 
As Anderson and Blackhurst (1992) note, the nexus of trade and environmental policies 
“have an above average risk of being exploited by special interest groups” so this might 
be a more realistic description of how policies get set. But the more interesting questions 
are how would using this approach change the conclusions we have reached so far, and 
are there issues we can address with this approach that we can not answer assuming 
welfare-maximising governments? There are five sets of questions we are going to be 
interested in. 
 
First, we know from the work of Buchanan and Tullock (1975) that there may be good 
reasons why various interest groups would lobby to have inefficient environmental 
policies in a closed economy. In brief, existing producers would prefer to have a given 
level of emissions reduction implemented through quantity constraints in which existing 
producers get grandfathered entitlements to emit pollution. The reason is that this 
effectively cartelises the industry and protects it from new entrants. One interesting 
question is how these arguments carry over to an open-economy setting. 
 
Second, it would be important to know to what extent and under which circumstances the 
interests of environmental and industry lobby groups converge. It is certainly easy to find   24 
examples for situations in which the interests of environmental and industrial lobby 
groups are opposed. However, as noted in the introduction it is also frequently the case 
that both industrialists and environmentalists support a policy of harmonisation of 
environmental policies. To what extent can political economy models illuminate the 
mechanisms behind these observations? 
 
Third, our analysis of welfare maximising governments suggested that, as trade is 
liberalised, there are no robust predictions that countries will systematically weaken 
environmental policies to compensate. Yet there are strongly held views that this is a 
significant risk. Moreover recent empirical work by Barrett and Graddy (2000) suggests 
there is a negative correlation between environmental standards and an index of 
corruption. Would political economy models give a  more robust prediction that trade 
liberalisation will result in environmental dumping?   
 
Fourth, there is a large gap between the analytical and empirical findings of section 2 that 
environmental policy has little impact on competitiveness and the public  perception. 
WTO (1999) quotes the example of a Wall Street Journal poll in 1990 in which a third of 
respondents believed that their jobs were at risk from environmental regulation, when 
data showed that between 1987 and 1990 only about 0.1% of US layoffs could be 
attributed to environmental regulations. There are two ways political economy models 
might account for this. One is that the potential impacts on competitiveness are indeed 
small, and that this gap in perception just reflects the success of lobby g roups in creating 
a public fear to influence policy. A more subtle explanation is that impacts on 
competitiveness are potentially larger than the data suggests, but that industrialists have 
been successful in ensuring  that where relatively tough environmental regulations are 
introduced these are accompanied by other forms of subsidy or protection which mitigate 
most of the effects. 
 
Finally, we have already argued that the introduction of a supra-national organisation that 
co-ordinates national policies could be an obvious way to overcome the inefficiencies 
that are created, if national policy making results in environmental dumping. However,   25 
such a new institution would also be the subject of lobbying efforts of both environmental 
and industrial groups. Environmentalists are, for example, opposed to the idea that the 
WTO could play this role in the area of environmental policy, fearing that the WTO is 
prone to be captured by multinational companies. An important challenge is therefore to 
determine how lobbying will shape the policies of a supra-national agency and how these 
policy outcomes compare to national policy making. 
 
There is now a small literature which applies political economy models to the study of 
trade and environment issues. Before we review this literature we briefly describe the 
ways in which political considerations have been integrated into environment and trade 
models. The most frequently used approach in the literature have been lobbying models, 
which portray the political process as a strategic interaction between the government and 
various special interest groups, while elections do not play an explicit role. In a number 
of contributions the influence of lobby groups is, for example, captured through the 
political support function approach, which assumes that an incumbent has an objective 
function which is a weighted sum of welfare and the contributions of different interest 
groups. A recent rigorous reformulation of this approach was given by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) in the context of trade protection and has been used extensively in the 
trade and environment literature.  
 
Alongside the lobbying approach there are also a number of alternative political economy 
approaches, which explicitly consider the role of elections. One such approach is the 
familiar  median voter model, which is really a way of aggregating diverse individual 
preferences, but without explicit behaviour by special interest groups. Another approach 
is the electoral competition model in which candidates for political parties first select 
what platform to stand on, and then campaign contributions influence the probabilities of 
different candidates being elected. Finally there is the political agency approach, which 
views the political process as a principal-agent relationship in which the voters as 
principals have to provide incentives for their political agent through elections. We now 
address the five questions set out above.  
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4.1 Efficiency of Environmental Policies 
 
In an early, and relatively informal, analysis, Hoekman and Leidy (1992) and Leidy and 
Hoekman (1994) argued that the normal incentives for producers to favour inefficient 
forms of environmental regulation (quantity-based with grandfathering of pollution 
permits for existing producers as opposed to an emission tax) as a means of cartelising an 
industry, would be reinforced in an open-economy setting. They point out that getting the 
industry to cooperate in this cartel manner would strengthen the industry’s ability to press 
for trade protection to offset the ‘injury’ caused by increased imports resulting from the 
tougher environmental regulations. 
 
Using more rigorous models of lobbying behaviour based on the Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) model of the political support function, Aidt (1998) and Schleich (1999) reach 
different conclusions. Schleich (1999) considers a model in which the government can 
use either production or consumption taxes/subsidies to deal efficiently with 
environmental damages linked directly to either production or consumption, or they can 
use trade policies, which are inefficient. Furthermore the government is lobbied by a 
number of industry lobby groups. An important property of the Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) approach is that the government effectively maximises a weighted sum of lobby 
contributions and social welfare. An important implication of this assumption is that the 
government has an interest in using instruments efficiently. This mechanism drives the 
finding of Schleich (1999), that governments only use their efficient production or 
consumption taxes to internalise the environmental damages, rather than inefficient trade 
taxes. The trade policy instruments are only used to redistribute income between the 
different lobby groups. Aidt (1998) considers a very similar model in which the 
government faces the choice between a tax on a polluting input and output taxes and 
subsidies. He also shows that only the efficient tax on the polluting input will be used to 
correct the environmental damages in the political equilibrium.   27 
4.2 Commonality of Interests  
 
In general, the interests of environmentalists and industrialists are likely to be opposed, 
simply because reducing emissions reduces profitability, particularly of industry-specific 
capital. However this need not always be the case. Hillman and Ursprung (1992, 1994) 
consider commonality of interests in an electoral competition model in which the only 
policy instrument is trade policy and the choice is between a free-trade candidate and a 
protectionist candidate (who would impose a prohibitive tariff on imports). Governments 
can be lobbied by domestic and foreign firms and by domestic environmentalists, and the 
question asked by Hillman and Ursprung is how environmentalists will vote. If pollution 
is caused by production, and environmentalists care only domestic pollution, then 
environmentalists vote for free trade, since that reduces domestic production and hence 
pollution. If pollution is related to consumption, or environmentalists care about pollution 
in both countries (Hillman and Ursprung refer to these groups as ‘supergreens’) or the 
environmentalists can coordinate their lobbying, then they will  vote for protection. 
Rauscher (1997) using a political support function approach shows that if only one policy 
instrument is available then the interests of environmentalists and industrialists generally 
diverge, but they will converge if policies (either trade or environmental) are targeted at 
foreign polluters. He also allows for the possibility that there may be some kinds of 
specific capital, say pollution abatement capital, whose returns are increased by tougher 
environmental policies.  
 
4.3 Trade Liberalisation and Environmental Dumping 
 
We now turn to the question whether political economy models suggest that governments 
will respond to a trade liberalisation by lowering environmental policies and how the 
predictions of political economy models differ from the policy choices of a welfare 
maximising government. Explicit consideration of the impact of trade liberalisation is 
provided by Frederiksson (1999) also using a Grossman-Helpman political support 
function approach. In his model there is a numeraire sector and a single import-
competing polluting industry, and two lobby groups – an environmental group and a   28 
group representing an industry-specific factor whose return is increasing in the level of 
emissions, so the interests of industrialists and environmentalists are opposed. There is an 
exogenously given import tariff, so, as we saw in section 2, a welfare-maximising 
government would impose  environmental policy tougher than the Pigouvian tax to 
correct for the excess domestic pollution resulting from the tariff. His main finding is that 
in the political equilibrium the environmental policy could be higher or lower than the 
welfare-maximising  policy and that trade liberalisation has an ambiguous effect on 
environmental policy that emerges in the political equilibrium. The intuition for this 
result is that the reduction in domestic output in response to the trade liberalisation 
reduces the incentives for both groups to lobby. So depending on parameters 
environmental policy could get weaker or tougher and environmental quality could get 
worse or better in the wake of a trade liberalisation. 
 
Bommer and Schulze (1999) argue that Frederiksson’s results depend on his assumption 
that lobbying is concentrated on the importing sector, while the exporting sector remains 
unorganised. In their model there are two sectors which differ in their pollution intensitiy. 
Both sectors use a specific factor, which o rganises as a lobby group. The trade 
liberalisation is assumed to increase the relative price of the dirty good, which expands 
output of the dirty sector and, with constant emission tax, increases pollution and also 
increases the return on the dirty specific factor and reduces the return on the clean 
specific factor. They present some evidence that this assumption is a good 
characterisation of most OECD countries. We saw in section 2  that in addition to this 
composition effect of a trade liberalisation there would be technique and scale effects in 
which a welfare maximising government would tighten environmental policy in response 
to both the increase in emissions and an increase in income. Bommer and Schulze using a 
political support function, but without the Grossman-Helpman micro-foundations, argue 
that there will be a further reason why a government may tighten environmental policy as 
trade is liberalised – to offset the distributional effects of trade liberalisation on the return 
to the specific factor in the clean industry.  
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Both Frederiksson and Bommer and Schulze assume competitive industries. Johal and 
Ulph (2001a,b) use a Barrett-type model of imperfect competition in which, if trade 
liberalisation outlaws trade instruments, welfare-maximising governments will engage in 
environmental-dumping. They introduce special interest groups in an electoral 
competition model in which there are ‘green’ and ‘brown’ parties who give, respectively, 
too high or too low a weight to environmental damages relative to social welfare, and so, 
ceteris paribus, would set too tough (lax) environmental policies relative to welfare-
maximising governments. There are environmental and industrial special interest groups 
who can give campaign contributions to parties of their own  type at home or abroad. 
Johal and Ulph show that if countries act non-cooperatively then in a political 
equilibrium lobbying increases the probability of electing green governments. There are 
two reasons. First, although environmentalists are assumed to care only about domestic 
pollution, they share with industrialists an interest in having the foreign government set 
tougher environmental standards, and this gives incentives for environmentalists, but not 
industrialists, to lobby abroad as well as at home. Second, as we saw in section 2, having 
weak environmental policies in all countries actually reduces industry profits, and this 
reduces the incentive of industrialists to lobby for brown governments.  
 
So in none of these papers do we find support for the notion that introducing political 
economy models unambiguously increases the prevalence of environmental dumping.  
 
4.4 Environmental Policies and Competitiveness. 
 
We have already seen that Hoekman and Leidy (1994) argued informally that in an open-
economy industrialists were more likely to press for inefficient forms of environmental 
regulation, since this would strengthen their ability to press for compensating trade 
protection. They conjecture that this could be one reason why there has been so little 
evidence of the impact of environmental policy on trade. They provide some evidence for 
this conjecture by pointing out that in the US the industries that have the highest 
abatement costs as a proportion of total costs account for a very high proportion of anti-
dumping cases, and claim that the same is true of the EU and Australia.   30 
 
The idea that political economy forces might ensure that sectors which have to bear high 
pollution abatement costs will be compensated through other policy instruments is 
pursued further in Eliste and Frederiksson (2001). They use Grossman-Helpman type 
model to show that stricter environmental policy for a sector and result in an endogenous 
increase in transfers to this sector. They test this prediction on a cross-country dataset 
which provides information on the stringency of pollution control in the agricultural 
sector and transfers to farmers. They find that stringent environmental policy is positively 
correlated with larger transfers to farmers. 
 
4.5 Policy Coordination.  
 
In section 2 we saw that in the case of either large-country models or models of imperfect 
competition, welfare-maximising governments acting independently may have incentives 
to set environmental policies which differ from Pigouvian to secure some trade 
advantage, but, even without transboundary pollution, these policies impose externalities 
on other countries. Indeed all countries can end up worse off by these beggar-thy-
neighbour policies. So there is a case for coordination of such policies. This is reinforced 
if there is transboundary pollution. But how is this argument affected if agencies in either 
states or some supra-national coordinating agency are prone to capture by special interest 
groups? 
 
We know that with transboundary pollution individual states acting non-cooperatively 
will set too weak environmental policies, both because of free-riding problems and, in the 
large-country case, to reduce leakage. It is sometimes argued that the activities of green 
lobby groups may help to overcome this failure o f coordination, by inducing 
governments to set tougher environmental policies than if they were welfare maximising. 
Conconi (2000), using a Grossman-Helpman-type model of political lobbying within 
large countries shows that this presumption is only true if countries can use trade 
instruments to deal with leakage effects. Then indeed green lobby groups press for higher 
emission taxes, and uncoordinated environmental policies may give a better outcome than   31 
coordinated policies. However, if countries are unable to use trade taxes to deal with 
leakage effects (because of trade liberalisation), then green lobby groups concerned about 
leakage effects may induce lower emission taxes than when non-cooperative 
governments are welfare maximising, and so this strengthens the case for coordination of 
environmental policies. 
 
Conconi assumes there are only green lobbyists. Similar results are found by Schleich 
and Orden (2000), who extend the analysis of Schleich (1999) to consider two large 
countries, but with lobby groups who also press for support for industries. When 
governments act non-cooperatively, then the outcome is as in Schleich: governments act 
efficiently, using environmental policies to deal with externalities and trade policies to 
exploit terms-of-trade; but they will give discounts to organised sectors at expense of 
unorganised sectors. Because there is transboundary pollution, countries impose two 
kinds of externalities on each other: through transboundary pollution and through terms-
of trade effects. If the governments set policies cooperatively, this will affect the political 
equilibrium. Surprisingly they show that with cooperation there may more environmental 
damage than without. The fact that governments no longer try to exploit terms-of-trade 
effect has ambiguous effects on environmental policies, while the fact that they 
internalise the damage caused in other countries unambiguously toughens policies. But 
these effects would apply with welfare-maximising governments. The additional effect 
that comes through political models is that because cooperation brings about efficiency 
gains this means governments can satisfy lobby groups at a lower cost to other lobby 
groups. They increase output and hence specific factor returns in organised sectors, and 
this effect on environmental damage may outweigh other effects.  
 
Johal and Ulph (2001a,b) also consider what happens when governments coordinate their 
policies, in this case to overcome environmental dumping and, in the second paper, 
transboundary pollution. However they model various asymmetries in lobbying 
behaviour designed to capture some of the concerns of environmentalists; there are 
differences in ability to influence electoral outcomes between lobby groups from 
different countries (e.g. northern countries have more influence than southern countries)   32 
between lobby groups of different types (e.g. industrialists have more influence than 
environmentalists) or between different levels of government (national and supra-national 
– to reflect ‘democratic deficit’  at supra-national level). They show that despite these 
asymmetries, it is always better to have policies coordinated at the supra-national level. 
So the benefits of dealing with policy externalities outweigh the costs of political 
distortions.  
 
5  Information and Political Economy 
 
We now put together the concerns of the last two sections. To see why this might be 
necessary, we could ask the simple question  – if members of the public know that 
politicians are likely to be influenced by special interest groups, why do they not take 
steps to prevent this? One way of doing this is through the election process. Politicians 
who blatantly stood for policies that favoured narrow sectional interests should not get 
elected. Politicians who are subsequently found to  have swayed their policies in the 
interests of certain groups may not get re-elected. If politicians value a career in politics 
and if elections are relatively frequent, this could act as a reasonable discipline. But of 
course this depends crucially on voters being able to tell when politicians have acted to 
favour special interests. We argued in the last section that even in political economy 
models, there are incentives for efficient choices of policies. But that assumes perfect 
information. It is frequently argued informally that one reason why governments may 
choose inefficient policies is because it is easier to hide the fact that they are acting to 
favour certain interests. Crudely, it may be easier to give certain industries trade 
protection on the grounds that it is offsetting potentially serious competitive effects from 
environmental policies than to give them protection outright. 
 
Another way voters may try to limit the scope for special interest groups to gain favours 
is to limit the power of politicians. In the limit voters could just mandate politicians to 
implement welfare maximising policies. But that again requires voters to be able to work 
out what welfare-maximising policies would be and to know whether or not politicians 
have implemented them. If politicians in office get access to information that is important   33 
in designing welfare-maximising policies, then restricting their scope for manoeuvre in 
advance will mean that policies may not be based on the best available information.  
 
Thus, it can be argued that information problems play an important role in understanding 
how the political process operates and institutions might be designed to deal with these 
problems (see Laffont (2000) for a general discussion).  
 
As far as we are aware the only papers that have sought to ad dress these issues in the 
context of trade and environmental problems are by ourselves. Sturm (2001) considers 
the case of trade disputes over products whose consumption causes potential damage to 
health or the environment. One example of such a dispute would be EU/US dispute over 
growth hormones in beef. The paper develops a simple two-country model. Suppose that 
one of the goods that the home country imports from the foreign country can cause some 
environmental or health damages, if it is consumed. For simplicity it is assumed that the 
risk of damages can either be high or low and that only units of the good which have been 
produced in the foreign country can cause damages. Furthermore observing the ex post 
damages does not reveal perfectly what the ex ante level of the risk was. A crucial 
assumption is that only politicians in power know the true value of the risk, and this is 
common to both countries, so there is no  underlying scientific dispute between the 
countries. 
 
The  governments face a decision whether or not to impose a product standard on the 
foreign product. Imposing the standard in the home country reduces consumer surplus, 
raises domestic profits and eliminates the risk of damage; in the foreign country it has 
similar effects but lowers foreign profits. The parameters of the model are chosen in such 
a way that if governments were welfare maximisers, they would both agree to implement 
the standard if the risk was high, and not implement it if the risk was low. This ensures 
that any dispute is purely political. More generally there will be range of risk values for 
which, in terms of expected welfare, the home country would want to impose the 
standard but the foreign country would not, so there could be genuine welfare 
differences.   34 
 
In the political context, the median voter cares only about social welfare. Politicians can 
be either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Good politicians will just pursue welfare maximising policies – 
imposing the standard only if the risk is high. Bad politicians want to favour producers of 
the good. The efficient way to do this would be by a lump-sum transfer. But voters could 
detect that, and would not re-elect them, which politicians care about, and so will not do 
this. The other, inefficient, way of favouring producers is, in the home country to 
implement the product standard even in the low risk state (‘green protectionism’), and in 
the foreign country not to implement the standard even in the high risk state 
(‘environmental dumping’). Of course voters know that bad politicians will do this. But 
voters do not know what the true risk is. All they can observe is whether or not politicians 
in the two countries have implemented the same policies or not. But this is a very 
imperfect signal. If there is a trade dispute, then all voters can tell is that at least one of 
the politicians must be bad. But they cannot tell whether it is a high risk state with a bad 
foreign politician not implementing the standard, while the home politician, who could be 
good or bad, does implement the standard; or a low risk state with a bad politician at 
home implementing the standard while the foreign politician, who could be good or bad, 
does not. Equally the absence of a trade dispute does not mean that both politicians are 
good – at least one must be good, but voters cannot tell which. So although voters will 
use their observation of whether or not a trade dispute has taken place to decide whether 
or not to re-elect politicians, Sturm shows that there can be political equilibrium in which 
the threat of not being re-elected is sufficiently low, given the fuzziness of the signal, that 
bad politicians will indeed choose to act in the way described above. 
 
So this paper gives a very nice formal demonstration of how environmental trade disputes 
can arise through the failure of the political process, which allows politicians who want to 
favour certain groups to use inefficient means of doing so because this is how they avoid 
detection and hence punishment at the ballot box. Sturm goes on to discuss other possible 
mechanisms for overcoming these problems. One mechanism often suggested is mutual 
recognition of standards, which would mean that the home (importing) country would 
have to impose the same standard as the foreign (exporting) country. This would   35 
eliminate ‘green protectionism’ by bad home politicians; it would not eliminate 
‘environmental dumping’ by bad foreign politicians and so may not increase welfare in 
the home country. Another possible mechanism is harmonisation. It is not clear what this 
would imply in this context. Given that only politicians in power know the true state it 
would not be possible for some supra-national agency to implement the first-best policy 
of imposing the standard in both countries only in the high-risk state, which, in the 
special model, is what both countries agree is welfare-maximising. Given that the 
standard is either applied or not, there is no intermediate level of policy on which 
countries could be harmonised. The way Sturm interprets harmonisation  is that voters 
require politicians to agree on a common policy and punish them with reduced re-election 
probabilities if they do not agree. However this does not reproduce the social optimum, 
because it does not rule out bad politicians in both countries agreeing to either both 
impose the standard in the low-risk state or both not impose the standard in the high-risk 
state. 
 
 However Sturm does not consider the question of whether expected welfare in both 
states might be higher with harmonisation than without. This is the question posed in 
Johal and Ulph (2001c,d). These papers extend the analysis of Ulph (2000) in which state 
governments acting non-cooperatively engage in environmental dumping which can be 
overcome by passing responsibility for environmental policy to a federal government, 
but, as in Sturm, only governments in power in the states know their own damage costs. 
The federal government could either set harmonised policies based on expected damage 
costs, or could use a more sophisticated policy to get states to reveal the information. 
Ulph(2000) assumed welfare-maximising governments and, as noted in section 3, 
showed, not surprisingly, that the more sophisticated policy dominated harmonisation, 
and that, for moderate levels of uncertainty about damage costs, harmonisation may be 
worse than leaving states in charge of environmental policy. 
 
The extension made by Johal and Ulph (2001c,d) is to incorporate the political set-up 
used in Johal and Ulph (2001a,b), discussed in section 4, in which there are elections 
between green and brown governments at state and federal levels, and where, in Johal   36 
and Ulph(2001d) the probabilities of electing green governments are influenced by 
campaign contributions by environmentalists and industrialists. The role of harmonisation 
is now very different. Society has to make a constitutional choice. Should it allow 
environmental policies to be set by political parties once they are in power and know 
their true damage costs? This has the merit of using information that becomes available, 
but at the cost of having parties who do not maximise welfare. Or should it restrict 
politicians’ discretion by mandating them to implement policies that maximise welfare, 
but based only on the information available at that time, namely expected damage costs.  
Since Johal and Ulph assume expected damage costs are the same in each state this 
implies harmonisation. Harmonisation has the cost that the policies adopted will not be 
fine-tuned to the actual damage costs states incur, the usual inefficiency argument. But it 
has the benefit of preventing capture of politicians, and, because the rule cannot be 
manipulated, reduces the scope for wasteful lobbying activities. This choice between 
harmonisation or allowing political discretion can be made whether policy is set at state 
or federal level. Johal and Ulph (2001c,d) show that, not surprisingly, harmonisation will 
be preferred when the difference between high and low damage costs is small relative to 
the difference between the weights different political parties attach to damage costs (i.e. 
the degree of political polarisation). More interestingly, they show that harmonisation 
will only be preferred when policy is set at the federal level if it had been preferred at the 
state level. So one cannot use the argument that policy is being moved from state to 
federal level to overcome environmental dumping as the rationale for imposing 
harmonisation.  
 
One important implication of the above analysis is that when one considers problems of 
imperfect information in a political setting (and we argued that the two are intimately 
linked), one finds not just that politicians may choose inefficient policies because that is a 
means of exploiting poorer information held by voters, but that overcoming the attempt 
by politicians to serve special interests may also involve the use of policies, such as 
harmonisation, which are criticised by economist as being inefficient, on the assumption 
of welfare-maximising governments.  
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The above discussion has been entirely theoretical. Is there any empirical support for 
these models of environmental policy setting with political economy and imperfect 
information? Sturm and List (2002) use a model very similar to Sturm (2001) outlined 
above in which politicians may have private preferences for the environment (which may 
reflect their desire to benefit certain interest groups) which differ from those of potential 
swing voters. Faced with the prospect of re-election, politicians will trim their policies to 
suit those of the swing voters. But if a politician faces a binding term limit (and is 
therefore a lame duck), she is free to set policies which reflect her own preferences. This 
suggests that environmental policies should change when politicians enter a lame duck 
phase. In the US term limit legislation constrains governors of a substantial number of 
states to serving no more than two terms in office. Sturm and List (2002) tests their 
model on US data on state environmental policies and find substantial support for the 
view that environmental policy changes during years in which a governor is a lame duck 
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
In this paper we have outlined a number of concerns that have been expressed about the 
nexus of policies linking trade and the environment and reviewed some of the recent 
literature by economists to see what light it sheds on these concerns. In section 2 we 
reviewed the ‘conventional’ literature, mainly theoretical but also empirical, and showed 
that it did not lend strong support either to the concerns or some of the policy 
recommendations. In particular, while there is danger that if further trade liberalisation 
rounds succeed in preventing governments using conventional trade instruments they 
may distort their environmental policies for trade purposes, there are no robust arguments 
for saying that this will imply environmental policies are too lax  – they may be too 
strong. While the empirical evidence suggests that trade liberalisation has not had a major 
damaging effect on the environment, nor that environmental policies have had a marked 
impact on trade, for reasons stated, there is no systematic empirical evidence that we are 
aware of on whether environmental policies are too weak or too strong. One strong 
conclusion from this literature was that harmonisation was unlikely to be desirable. 
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We then reviewed a much smaller literature on what we believe to be key issues in 
sorting out trade and environment issues – information problems and the possible capture 
of politicians by special interest groups. The models are too disparate at this stage to 
allow us to draw firm conclusions, but we would argue that they do not provide any 
stronger basis for the concerns outlined in the introduction. In particular they give no 
more reason for believing that in a world of trade liberalisation there will be a systematic 
race to the bottom in environmental standards.  
 
What does this imply for the discussions that will be taking place over the next few years 
about whether or how environmental considerations should be built into the next round of 
trade liberalisation? Bierman (2001) argues that what is called for is an Authoritative 
Interpretation of Article XX which clarifies the role of trade measures in support of 
multilateral environmental agreements, allows countries to protect themselves against 
imports of goods whose consumption causes environmental damage, provided this is 
done in a non-discriminatory fashion, and rules out unilateral use of trade measures 
against countries who have different environmental standards for production and process 
methods. Unless multilateral environmental agreements are interpreted very widely, it is 
not clear that this addresses the issue of countries distorting their environmental policies 
for trade or political reasons.  
 
The fundamental challenge, as we have set out in the last half of this survey, is to 
discriminate between differences in environmental standards that arise through 
comparative advantage and differences that arise from attempts to exploit market power 
or favour special interests. In facing this challenge it is crucial to recognise that local 
governments are likely to have much better information about local environmental 
damages than supra-national agencies, but also that they will use this informational 
advantage to favour interest groups. Using expert scientific panels may resolve some 
aspects of environmental disputes, though as Sturm (2001a) notes bodies of scientific 
experts may not be sufficiently isolated from political pressure, and in any case the 
disputes may be much more about how different countries value a given environmental 
impact. Similarly, looking for inconsistencies in the way governments apply   39 
environmental standards in areas exposed to trade and areas not exposed to trade will be a 
useful reality check. But governments can apply environmental policies consistently and 
in a non-discriminatory manner and still be engaging in either environmental dumping or 
green protectionism. The challenge is to design mechanisms that both get local politicians 
to reveal information truthfully and limit their scope for exploiting it to favour special 
interest groups. In some cases this may lead to adopting what normally look like 
inefficient policies, and we gave the example of harmonisation, but stress this is just an 
example and does not mean we are endorsing harmonisation. What the best intervention 
will look like needs a lot more careful analysis than the research to date has provided. 
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